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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Employer, 
-and-
9TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 710, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
//2A-1/24/79 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Case Nos. C-1722 
C-1724 
C-1725 
TO: 9TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 710, SEIU, AFL-CIO 
STATE OF NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 
A motion having been made by The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-rCIO on the basis of alleged newly discovered evidence 
that the certification in the above entitled matter be annulled, and it appear-
ing to the Board that substantial questions relating to the validity of that 
certification have been raised, 
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED to show cause to this Board why the motion should 
not be granted-, by submitting a written response to the motion not later than 
February 2, 1979. 
Dated, January 25, 1979 
TO: See attached listing 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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TO: Perry Heidecker, Esq., Israelson, Manning & Raab, 60 East 42nd Street, 
New York, N.Y. 10017 
Patrick McKay, 9th Judicial District Court Employees Association, 
c/o 65 Court Street, White Plains, N.Y. 10601 
Patrick McKay, 9th Judicial District Court Employees Association, 
258 Saw Mill River Road, Elmsford, N.Y. 10523 
Howard Rubenstein, Esq., Director of Employee Relations, Office of 
Court Administration, Agency Building 4, 20th Floor, Empire State Plaza, 
Albany, N.Y. 12223 
Stephen J. Wiley, Esq., Roemer and Featherstonhaugh, 99 Washington 
Avenue, Albany, N.Y. 12210 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 826, COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
#2B-l/24/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0143 
BLITMAN & KING (CHARLES E. BLITMAN, ESQ., of 
Counsel) for Respondent 
JOHN W. PARK, ESQ., for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Chief Legal Officer of the City of 
Binghamton. It alleges that Local 826, Council 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 826) 
violated §210.1 of the Taylor Law in that it engaged in, caused, instigated, 
encouraged and condoned a strike on January 4, 6 and 7, 1977, when employees of 
the City's Street and Sanitation Departments concertedly refused temporary job 
assignments and overtime and engaged in a slowdown in the collection of garbage. 
The hearing officer found merit in the charge. He determined that on 
January 4, 6 and 7 all laborers in the Street Department who were .requested to 
do so refused to assist in the collection of garbage either on an overtime basis 
or instead of their regular duties. He further determined that among the 
employees who refused these assignments were officers of Local 826. The hearing 
officer also determined that employees of the Sanitation Department engaged in 
a slowdown on January 6 and 7, as evidenced by the fact that significantly less 
garbage was collected on those days than is ordinarily collected. 
Local 826 filed exceptions to the report and recommendations of the 
hearing officer. It asked for and was given an opportunity to argue orally in 
support of its exceptions. It contends that there was no strike because the 
employees in the Street Department were not obligated to accept assignments in 
the Sanitation Department. In support of this contention, Local 826 argues that 
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the collective agreement provides that when there is a need for additional 
workers in the Sanitation Department, assignments are to be made on a citywide 
basis and not only from the Street Department. In response, the City argues 
that it was authorized to make assignments from the Street Department only and 
that, in any event, if the employees in the Street Department deemed the assign 
ment to violate the agreement, they were obligated to accept the assignments 
and to grieve under the contract. 
We find it unnecessary to determine whether the agreement imposed 
Sanitation Department duties upon Street Department employees because we agree 
with the City's argument that, even if it did not, the employees would have to 
perform the assignments and then grieve. In Farmingdale Union Free School 
District, 11 PERB 1(3055, we held that a concerted refusal to perform work 
constitutes a strike even if the work assignment is improper, unless the 
assignment would expose the employees to unwarranted danger. 
Another basis of Local 826's exception is that the low tonnage 
collected by the Sanitation Department on January 6 and 7 is not proof of a 
slowdown because it can be explained by other factors. Specifically, it 
argues that the low tonnage is explained by the many Christmas trees that had 
to be collected because Christmas, trees do not pack well and permit less 
tonnage in each truckload. The hearing officer considered and rejected this 
argument. He found that the garbage tonnage collected during early January 
1976 was significantly greater; than that collected in January 1977, even 
though trees were also collected during January 1976. He further reasoned 
that if trees did not pack well, the trucks would fill more quickly, allowing 
for more trips to the landfill, but on January 6 and 7, 1977 there were fewer 
trips to the landfill than were made during the prior ten weeks. 
We affirm the findings of fact of the hearing officer that support his 
conclusion that the employees in the Street Department of the City of 
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Binghamton struck on January 4, 6 and 7, and that the strike is attributable 
to Local 826. Having determined that Local 826 violated Section 210.1 of the 
Taylor Law on January 4, 6 and 7 by reason of the strike of the employees in 
the Street Department of the City of Binghamton, we do not find it necessary 
to reach the question of whether it also violated the law by reason of a 
strike in the Sanitation Department on January 6 and 7. Moreover, the penalty 
imposed for this three day strike would not have been different even if we 
were to have determined that the strike included employees in the Sanitation 
Department. 
The penalty imposed reflects the fact that the strike was not 
occasioned by any acts of extreme provocation on the part of the City, that 
the impact on the health, safety and welfare of the City was not severe, 
and that Local 826 had not struck before. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the.City of Binghamton cease deducting 
dues or agency shop payments on behalf of Local 826 for a 
period of three months commencing on the first practicable 
date after the date of this decision. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop payments shall be deducted on their behalf by the 
City until Local 826 affirms that it no longer asserts the 
right to strike against any government, as required by §210.3(g) 
of the Taylor Law. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 24, 1979 ffcv+e*f/? /fat 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
c%<^ /£%g^g. 
Ida KMjis/, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LANCASTER ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE PERSONNEL 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
#20-1/24/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0158 
MARTIN L. BARR, ESQ. (RICHARD A. CURRERI, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Charging Party 
EMANUEL TABACHNICK, ESQ., for Respondent 
The charge herein was filed by the Counsel to the Public Employment 
Relations Board. It alleges that the Lancaster Association of Service 
Personnel (LASP) violated Section 210.1 of the Taylor Law in that it caused, 
instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged in a strike against the 
Lancaster Central School District (District) on September 9, 1977. 
The District school bus drivers, who are in a negotiating unit repre-
sented by LASP, failed to perform their driving duties on September 9, 1977, 
until approximately 2:00 p.m. and the hearing officer concluded that this 
failure constituted a strike by LASP. He also determined that the strike was 
not caused by any acts of extreme provocation of the District. He found that 
the strike occurred during the course of negotiations between LASP and the 
District for a contract to succeed one that had expired over a year earlier. 
Among the 48 school bus drivers in the negotiating unit, 39 were LASP 
members, including the LASP president and its grievance chairman. The strike 
terminated at 2:00 p.m. when the District agreed with the LASP president and 
grievance chairman that, "if the strikers have returned to work," it would 
withdraw a change it had made in the scheduling of bus runs which LASP objected 
to and it would increase the tempo of negotiations. 
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LASP has not filed exceptions to the hearing officer's conclusion that 
it violated Section 210.1 of the Taylor Law and that there was no extreme 
provocation. 
The penalty imposed reflects the fact that the strike was not 
occasioned by any acts of extreme provocation on the part of the District, 
that the impact on the health, safety and welfare of the District was not 
severe, and that LASP had not struck before. 
NOW, THEEEFOEE, WE ORDER that the District cease deducting dues or 
agency shop payments on behalf of LASP for a period of three 
months, commencing on the first practicable date after the 
date of this decision.. Thereafter, no dues or agency shop 
payments shall be deducted on its behalf by the District until 
LASP affirms that it no longer asserts the right to strike 
against any government, as required by Section 210.3(g) of 
the Taylor Law. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 25, 1979 
$s*j*^eP. "itz^j-iusA^^/ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
jfiL*. /UU^A^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
THE LIMESTONE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LIMESTONE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2787, 
Charging Party. 
KELLEY & MONIGHAN, ESQS., for Respondent 
JOHN W. CAMPION, for Charging Party 
On September 29, 1977, a hearing officer determined that the Board of 
Education and Administration of the Limestone Union Free School District 
(District) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law by eliminating the 
Future Homemakers of America, an extracurricular program, and by dismissing 
Margaret Very as the unpaid faculty advisor of that program. The basis for 
this decision was his finding that the reason for the District's action "was 
to retaliate against Very for her successful utilization of the grievance/ 
arbitration procedure." The hearing officer ordered "that the Future Homemakers 
of America be reactivitated to its former status and that the position of advisor 
be offered to Margaret Very on the same terms as had previously existed." He 
also ordered that the District post an appropriate notice. 
The District filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision on 
November 8, 1977. The District .does not challenge the hearing officer's finding 
that its decision to eliminate the extracurricular program and dismiss Very as 
faculty advisor of it was motivated by design to retaliate against her for her 
5555 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2493 
Board - U-2493 -2 
successful utilization of the grievance/arbitration procedure. Rather, it 
argues that the decision violates Education Law §414, which authorizes it to 
grant or withhold the use of its facilities for activities such as the Future 
Homemakers of America as it sees fit. It further argues that the proposed order 
is moot because Very had ceased to be an employee of the District even before 
the hearing officer's decision was issued. 
The District's argument that it committed no Taylor Law violation 
because the Education Law authorizes it to abolish the Future Homemakers of 
America program must be rejected. Action by a school district that is other-
wise authorized by the Education Law cannot stand when the district's action is 
motivated by a design to frustrate the exercise of Taylor Law rights by an 
employee, Board of Education Central School District No. 1 of the Town of Grand 
Island v. Helsby, 37 App.Div. 2d 493 (4th Dept, 1971), 4 PERB 1(7016. 
Accordingly, we affirm the hearing officer's decision that the District vio-
lated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law by abolishing the extracurricular 
program and by dismissing Very as the faculty advisor. 
The appropriateness of a remedy for the violation is complicated by the 
circumstance that Very is no longer in the employ of the District. This matter 
was first considered by us at our meeting of December 20, 1977. At that time, 
we ascertained that another charge had been filed against the District alleging 
that Very had been improperly discharged (Case No. U-2956) . Therefore, we 
stated in our Minutes, 
"[t]hat the issue in this case, to wit, whether Margaret 
Very should be redesignated faculty advisor of the Future 
Homemakers of America, an extracurricular activity at the 
Limestone Union Free School District, was inseparable from 
the issue in Case No. U-2956, pending before a hearing officer, 
to wit, whether the discharge of Margaret Very was an improper 
practice. Accordingly it [PERB] will hold the instant case 
until Case No. U-2956 comes before it." 
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We are now informed that the charge in Case No. U-2956 was withdrawn on 
December 12, 1978, pursuant to a settlement that did not involve the reinstate-
ment of Very. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to order her reinstatement 
as faculty advisor of the Future Homemakers of America or even the reactivation 
of that program, the elimination of which was directed against her. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that: 
1. the Board of Education and Administration of the 
Limestone Union Free School District cease and desist 
from discriminating against employees in the negotiating 
unit represented by the Limestone Teachers Association, 
Local 2787, because they utilize the grievance and 
arbitration procedures provided in the agreement between 
the parties, and 
2. that the Board of Education and Administration of • 
Limestone Union Free School District conspicuously 
post a notice in the form attached at locations ordi-
narily used for written communications to the employees 
within the negotiating unit, stating that it will not 
discriminate against employees in the negotiating unit 
represented by the Limestone Teachers Association, 
Local 2787, because they utilize the grievance and 
arbitration procedures provided in the agreement between 
the parties. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 25, 1979 £/&. M/7.&? <rr /Y-C^^^ 
l a ro ld R. Newman, Chairman 
Sik, k%*^ 
5557 
Ida Klaras,/ Member 
David C. Randies, Member. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify our employees that: 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE LIMESTONE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
WILL NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST EMPLOYEES IN 
THE NEGOTIATING UNIT REPRESENTED BY THE • 
LIMESTONE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 2787 , 
BECAUSE THEY UTILIZE THE GRIEVANCE AND 
ARBITRATION PROCEDURES PROVIDED IN THE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. 
, Employer 
Dated. . , By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2E-1/24/79 
In the Matter of 
HEUVELTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
HEUVELTON CENTRAL SCHOOL NON-TEACHING 
PERSONNEL UNIT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3228 
\ 
ARTHUR F. GRISHAM, for Respondent 
RICHARD V. HUNT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
On March 27, 1978, the Heuvelton Central School District Non-Teaching 
Personnel Unit of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.(CSEA) filed 
a charge alleging that the Heuvelton Central School District (District) vio-
lated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Taylor Law by refusing to negotiate an agree-
ment to succeed the 1976-78 contract. The District responded that CSEA had 
consented to the continuation of the 1976-78 agreement for one year when it 
failed to present its negotiation demands on or before February 1, 1978. It 
relied upon Article XIX of the 1976-78 agreement, which provides: 
"The Civil Service Employees Association agrees 
to present its negotiating package to the Board 
of Education on or before February First of each 
negotiating year. In the event that negotiating 
package is not presented as above, it is to be 
understood that the current agreement will be 
continued." 
The identical clause had been in three prior agreements, which respectively 
covered 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. 
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CSEA argued that the District could not rely upon Article XIX because 
the past practice of the parties had accorded to it a meaning that was 
different from its literal language, thereby excusing CSEA from compliance with 
it. To this, the District responded that the issue of contract interpretation 
is beyond the jurisdiction of this Board and that, in any event, the parties' 
past practice was not relevant to CSEA's current obligation to comply with 
the limitations of Article XIX. 
The hearing officer found that the past practices of the parties had 
not altered CSEA's obligation under Article XIX and determined that CSEA had 
waived its right to negotiate a 1978-79 agreement to succeed the 1976-78 
agreement by virtue of its failure to submit demands by February 1, 1978. 
Both parties have filed exceptions. The District excepts to the hearing 
officer's refusal to reject, as a matter of law, any consideration of the 
parties' past practices and to his failure to rule that he had no authority 
to interpret Article XIX of the agreement. CSEA excepts to the hearing 
officer's determination that Article XIX had not been altered by the parties' 
past practices and that it constituted a waiver of its right to negotiate 
a successor to the 1976-78 agreement. We affirm the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
The District cited St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1[3058, in support of 
its argument that this Board has no authority to interpret Article XIX. Reli-
ance upon this decision is misplaced. That decision states: 
"There may be occasions when it is necessary for 
this Board to interpret provisions of an agreement, 
but to a limited extent of determining whether there 
has been a statutory violation, for example to 
determine whether an employee organization has 
waived its right to negotiate...." 
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11 
Such an occasion is presented in the instant case. In considering 
the parties' past practices, the hearing officer correctly recognized that 
such past practices may aid in interpreting ambiguous provisions of an agree-
ment, or even in deciding whether the parties had altered the terms of an 
agreement. In the instant case, however, the hearing officer ruled that 
Article XIX was explicit and unambiguous. He further found, as a fact, that 
the provision was not altered. The evidence indicates that the District had 
accepted a late submission of demands on one occasion, but this did not con-
stitute an advance consent for future late submissions. We conclude that the 
District was under no obligation to negotiate with the charging party after 
February 1, 1978. 
NOW, THEREFORE, having determined that the failure of CSEA to present 
its negotiating package to the District on or before February 1, 1978 consti-
tuted a consent to the continuation of that agreement for one year and that 
the District was under no obligation to negotiate with the charging party 
after that date, 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 25, 1979 
•p^Wd^ £ /£H 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Membt 
11 See also §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law which authorizes this Board to 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of an agreement'that 
also constitutes an improper practice. 5561 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEEDSPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
WEEDSPORT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
In the Matter of 
UNION SPRINGS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNION SPRINGS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
#2F-l/24/79 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1633 
CASE NO. C-1637 
HARRY SLYWIAK, for Petitioners 
MATTHEW R. FLETCHER, for Employers 
These two representation cases, which we have consolidated for decision, 
present identical questions: (1) are long-term substitute teachers employees 
within the meaning of the Taylor Law and (2) if so, should they be included in 
negotiating units with regular teachers. The Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation answered both questions in the affirmative and he 
granted the petitions of the Weedsport Teachers Association and the Union 
Springs Teachers Association to add long-term substitute teachers to instruc-
tional units represented by them. Both the Weedsport Central School District 
and the Union Springs Central School District have filed exceptions to his 
1] 
determinations. They argue that, as temporary employees, long-term substi-
tutes have only a casual relationship to the employment that they hold and 
are, therefore, not employees within the meaning of the Taylor Law. They 
further argue that, even if long-term substitutes were employees, they could 
not be properly included in units with regular teachers because of a conflict of 
1] The exceptions also argue that the hearing officer erred in excluding evi-
dence that long-term substitutes were not represented in adjacent school 
districts. This ruling was not error because the evidence offered is 
irrelevant to the questions presented by the cases. 
Board - C-1633 & C-1637 -2 
interest between the two groups. The alleged conflict of interest is that 
regular teachers displace long-term substitutes if some teachers must be laid 
off. 
FACTS 
The Weedsport Central School District employed 16 long-term substitutes 
to fill 17 long-term substitute positions from September 1972 through June 1978 
as follows: 
1972-73 3 
1973-74 1 
1974-75 3 
1975-76 3 
1976-77 4 
1977-78 3 
TOTAL 17 
One of the long-term substitutes worked in both the 1976-77 and 1977-78 school 
years. All of the 16 long-term substitutes worked from the time of their 
appointment until the end of the school year. One worked for two consecutive 
years and six worked for a full year. Nine of the long-term substitutes were 
subsequently appointed to tenure-bearing positions. 
The Union Springs Central School District employed 18 long-term substi-
tutes to fill 25 long-term substitute positions from September 1972 through 
June 1978, as follows: 
1972-73 1 
1973-74 1 
1974-75 3 
1975-76 6 
1976-77 6 
1977-78 8 •% 
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Board - C-1633 & C-1637 ' _3 
Three of the long-term substitutes worked for two full years. Four others 
worked for more than one year; six worked for a single full year; and five 
for less than a full year. Five of the 18 individuals who worked as long-term 
substitute teachers were subsequently hired to tenure-bearing positions. Like 
most regular teachers in tenure-bearing positions, most long-term substitutes 
are full-time employees, although there are some half-time employees in both 
categories. Teachers .in both categories are required to prepare for classes ai 
must attend teachers' meetings. 
DISCUSSION 
These are the first cases presenting the issue of whether long-term 
substitute teachers are covered by the Taylor Law. In their briefs, the 
parties based their arguments on the applicability of criteria for determining 
who are seasonal employees as articulated in State of New York, 5 PERB 113022 
and 5 PERB 113039. There, we determined that 
"employees are casual if '(1) the season is shorter than 
six weeks a year; or (2) the employees are required to work 
fewer than 20 hours a week (the Board recognized that this 
standard might not apply to teachers, especially in insti-
tutions of higher education); or (3) fewer than 60% of the 
employees in the title return for at least two successive 
seasons.'" 
We do not find the criteria for determining seasonal employment to be appli-
2] 
cable to long-term temporary positions. Rather, we affirm the determination 
2] Were those criteria to be applicable, vre would still conclude that the 
long-term substitutes employed by the two school districts were employees 
within the meaning of the Taylor Law. There is no question but that they 
meet the first two criteria articulated in the State of New York case. 
Even the third standard, which is narrowly related to seasonal employment, 
is met. In Weedsport, nine of 16 long-term substitutes were subsequently 
appointed to tenure-bearing positions and a tenth returned for a second 
school year. In Union Springs, five of 18 long-term substitutes were 
subsequently appointed to tenure-bearing positions and two others 
returned for a second school year. However, if each semester is deemed 
to be a season, 13 long-term substitutes worked for at least two 
successive seasons. 
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of the Director that 
"the long-term substitutes are hired for specific periods 
of time, determined in advance by the employer, and these 
periods are themselves of sufficient length to measure the 
continuity of employment necessary to warrant coverage 
under the Act." 3] 
We also affirm the decision of the Director that long-term substitutes 
should be added to the teacher units in Weedsport and Union Springs. Both 
the long-term substitutes and the regular teachers perform the same profes-
sional duties under similar conditions. The argument that there is a conflict 
of interest between them because long-term substitutes may be displaced by 
returning regular teachers is not persuasive. This creates no greater conflict 
than exists between regular teachers of different seniority. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that: 
1. The long-term substitutes employed by the Weedsport 
Central School District should be added to the existing 
instructional unit. 
2. The long-term substitutes employed by the Union Springs 
Central School District should be added to the existing 
instructional unit. 
Dated: New York, New York 
January 25, 1979 
tg^fr^f 
farold R. Newman, Chairman 
.i4/l4i^<£<~^\ 
Ida Klatf^  ./Member * 
David C. Randies, Member 
3] The California Educational Employees Relations Board has reached a similar 
conclusion. In Belmont Elementary School, 1 PERB 127 (1976), it found that 
long-term substitutes were covered employees of a school district that 
usually hired them for more than one semester and they were eligible for re-
employment and were required to prepare lesson plans and to attend faculty 
meetings. In the private sector, persons designated "temporary" employees 
are deemed to be casual workers and, therefore, not covered. However, 
"temporary" is construed as strictly short-term employment of known duration 
affording no reasonable expectation of longer periods.of employment...National 
Opinion Research Center, 187 NLRB #93 (1977), and Burlington Rendering Co_^ , 
161 NLRB 1 (1966), 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK), 
Respondent, 
- and -
PETER MARSH, 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH M. BRESS, ESQ., for Respondent 
(LAWRENCE C. FRANCO, ESQ, ,:I:Q£'.Counsel) 
WILLIAM W. FINEMAN, for Charging Party 
The matter herein comes to us upon the exceptions of the 
charging party to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his 
improper practice charge against the State of New York, State 
University of New York (State). The charge, filed December 12, 
1977, alleged that the State had discriminated against Marsh by 
denying him half-time employment in the Department of Music at 
the State University of New York at Binghamton because he was 
processing a grievance against the State, and that this denial of 
employment was a violation of Civil Service Law §209-a.l(c). 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge upon an ultimate finding 
that the State's decision to hire someone other than the charging 
party for a part-time position was based on legitimate management 
reasons and that the decision not to offer the work to charging 
party was not improperly motivated. 
//2G-1/24/79 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. U-3055 
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Peter Marsh, the charging party, was employed in 1969 as a 
full-time lecturer, performing both teaching duties (i.e., violin 
instruction) and serving as a member of the Lenox String Quartet. 
i 
In 1975, Marsh was promoted to the rank of Associate Professor 
on the basis of a half-time continuing appointment.' In conjunc-
tion with that half-time appointment, Marsh was also given a 
separate half-time appointment,as Artist-in-Residence to continue 
as long as he remained a member of the Lenox Quartet and as long 
as the group remained in residence at the University. It appears 
to have been the intention of the University that the Artist-in-
Residence appointment be only a temporary one. 
In 1977, the Lenox Quartet was not funded and Marsh was noti 
fied in August of 1977 that his half-time appointment under the 
Artist-in-Residence program was terminated. Marsh grieved the 
termination of the Artist-in-R.esidence appointment and sought as 
alternative remedies either the restoration of the temporary half-
time appointment as an Artist-in-Residence or an additional half-
time faculty appointment. 
It became apparent during the period that the grievance was 
being processed and at the beginning of the Fall Term in 1977 
that violin instruction over and above that which Marsh was pro-
viding was needed. At that time, he was the only violin instruc-
tor in the Department. At or about the beginning of the term, 
Marsh sent at least two memoranda to Mitchell, Chairman of the 
Music Department, requesting that he be returned to full-time 
status in order to instruct the additional students. Mitchell 
sought and obtained permission from Dean Grebstein to offer a 
part-time appointment in violin instruction. A person was in fact 
hired at a so-called one-eighth position. 
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Thus, during this period of time, while Marsh continued to 
press his grievance in which he claimed a right to full-time 
status and was at the same time requesting Mitchell to recommend 
him for an additional half-time appointment because of instruc-
tional needs, a decision was made to hire another person on a 
part-time basis. Mitchell sought the advise of Dean Grebstein as 
to what consideration to give Marsh in view of his pending grie-
vance. Grebstein sought the advie.e of the Director of Personnel •'. 
at Binghamton, who advised that all discussion regarding Mr. 
Marsh's employment status should be avoided because of the subject 
matter of his grievance. The Director of Personnel believed that 
since he was seeking additional employment as a remedy for his 
grievance there should be no discussion at the departmental level 
about returning him to full-time status. Marsh was told by 
Mitchell that she had been instructed to refrain from discussing 
with him any matters relating to his grievance or the remedy that 
he sought, i.e., full employment. She further advised the rest of 
the Music Department that they could not consider expansion of 
Marsh's position nor discuss it with him as long as he had a 
gr i evan c e p en ding. 
Chairman Mitchell and Dean Grebstein both testified that in 
filling the part-time position, however, they were governed by 
budgetary concerns because the Department was being run at a defi-
cit and, most importantly, by a desire to offer diversity in 
instruction styles within the Department. Both testified that 
the Department had always attempted to have at least two different 
violin teachers where the number of students justified it and that 
the use of temporary part-time instructors was the practice in the 
Department. 
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DISCUSSION 
We view this case differently than did the hearing officer. 
He concluded that "the testimony by Marsh and other witnesses for 
the charging party all support an inference that the reason that 
he was not considered for the additional part-time employment was 
due to his filing of a grievance" (emphasis supplied). He 
determined, however, that the inference was rebutted by evidence 
that Marsh would not have been given the additional hours in any 
event and, thus, no violation occurred. 
We distinguish between the refusal to consider Marsh and the 
refusal to hire him. Our review of the record, including the 
testimony of the witnesses on behalf of the State, leads us to the 
inescapable conclusion that the pendency of Marsh's grievance 
seeking the restoration of a half-time position prompted the 
officials of the University to put aside any consideration of 
Marsh in connection with the problem of how to meet the instruc-
tional needs of the Music Department in the Fall of 1977. While 
this refusal to consider Marsh may well not have been intended to 
"punish" him for having filed the grievance, the effect of their 
conduct was to do so and to lead him to believe that they had done 
so. This clear linkage between the filing and prosecution of the 
grievance and the decision not to consider him for additional 
employment must be deemed to have had a "chilling" effect on all 
employees who, like Marsh, might exercise their protected right to 
file a grievance. Thus, the State's refusal to consider Marsh 
constituted a violation of §209-a.l(c) of the Act. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that the State of New York 
(State University of New York) has violated §209-a.l(c) of the 
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Taylor Law, and 
WE ORDER that the State of New York (State University of New 
York): 
1. cease and desist from refusing to consider Peter 
Marsh for instructional and other appointments because 
of his exercise of his protected right to file grievances 
2. cease and desist from discriminating against any 
employees as a result of their exercise of rights pro-
tected by the Ta^ rlor Law; and 
3. conspicuously post appropriate notices to be supplied 
by this Board at the Binghamton campus of the State 
University of New York 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 25, 1979 
. /Ifeuy-i fjfri*cr-*<sCk^li^ 
a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
£b~ Au*... 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOY 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
 v 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT^ ACT -
we hereby notify our employees that: 
1 . WE WILL NOT REFUSE TO CONSIDER PETER MARSH 
' . FOR INSTRUCTIONAL AND OTHER APPOINTMENTS BECAUSE OF 
. ' HIS EXERCISE OF HIS PROTECTED RIGHT TO FILE 
GRIEVANCES. ' 
2 , WE WILL NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ANY EMPLOYEE 
AS A RESULT OF THEIR EXERCISE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED BY . 
THE TAYLOR LAW, 
Employer 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
Respondent, 
- and -
ROCHESTER POLICE LOCUST CLUB, INC., 
Charging Party. 
LOUIS N. KASH, ESQ., by GERALD P. COOPER, Of Counsel 
for Respondent 
GARY W. VAN SON, Esq., for Charging Party 
On July 14, 1978, the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc. 
(Union) filed the charge herein, which, as amended, alleges that 
the City of Rochester (City) failed to negotiate in good faith in 
violation of Civil Service Law (CSL) §209-a.l(d) by refusing to 
negotiate with regard to the demands of the Union hereinafter set 
forth. The City acknowledged that it had not negotiated with 
respect to the demands, asserting that they do not constitute 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
At the request of the parties, and in accordance with §204.4 
of our Rules, an intermediate report from a hearing officer was 
dispensed with. After a conference with the hearing officer, the 
parties submitted briefs in support of their positions. 
Prior to considering the individual demands, we wish to 
reiterate the policy enunciated by us in Pearl River UFSD, 
11 PERB 1[3085 and Town of Haverstraw, Case No. U-3438, decided 
December 14, 1978. In this case, as in those, some of the 
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proposed demands contain two or more elements, at least one of 
which is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. In accordance 
with the policy established in those cases, each demand is deemed 
a nonmandatory subject of negotiation if it has nonmandatory 
elements presented as an.inseparable part of the total demand. As 
we did in those cases, we will express no opinion here as to 
whether alternative separable demands containing some, but not 
all, of the elements of the actual demands made and now before us 
would be mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
Several of the demands now before us are framed in language 
so ambiguous as to require recourse to extrinsic sources in order 
to determine the meaning attached to them by one or both parties. 
The parties, in their briefs, in addition to arguing in support of 
their respective positions, have argued the meaning of these 
demands. The Union, in its brief, has also revised some of its 
demands. While we are, of course, committed to the public policy 
of encouraging collective bargaining as to terms and conditions of 
employment, it is not our function to negotiate for the parties or 
to clarify their positions for them. Therefore, only where a 
demand, as phrased, may reasonably be construed to be mandatory, 
will we so construe it. 
1 
We now consider the demands at issue. 
1. Article 5.3, Current Assignments (Expired Agreement) 
It is further agreed to and understood by the parties that 
members presently designated as Detectives Grade A, B, C 
and Plainclothesmen shall remain so designated consistent 
with current Rules and Regulations of the Department as of 
1 The City contends that some provisions in the prior agreement 
are not mandatory subjects of negotiation even though the Unior 
has not demanded their continuation. Those provisions are not 
at issue. 
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July 1, 1974, and that nothing in Sections 1 and 2 above 
shall be construed to compel those members described herein 
to participate in the Merit Testing programs provided in 
Section 1. However, nothing in this Section shall prevent 
members described herein from participating in the program 
provided in Section 1 above. 
A demand which falls within the jurisdiction of a Civil 
Service Commission is not a mandatory subject of negotiation 
between an employer and a union, City of Albany, 7 PERB 1f3078. 
The demand as phrased is so ambiguous that we cannot ascertain 
from its language whether its subject matter falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Monroe County Civil Service Commission. It 
would not be reasonable to construe such an ambiguous demand to 
be a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
2. Article 5.4, Untitled (Proposed) 
The City agrees to prepare a testing procedure sixty (60) 
days prior to the expiration date of existing Investigators 
list and to adopt a policy of holding the test within four-
teen (14) days after the expiration date of the existing list. 
This provision falls within the jurisdiction reserved to 
the Monroe County Civil Service Commission and, therefore, is not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
3. Article 5. 5, Untitled (Proposed) 
The City agrees to fill all Investigator vacancies within 
the Police Department within thirty (30) days from Investi-
gator lists when available. The City will forward to the 
Club a list of Investigator vacancies within fifteen (15) 
days of their occurrence. This notice will clearly state 
the date when the vacancy occurred. 
We view this as an inseparable unitary demand. The decision 
as to whether vacancies should be filled is not a mandatory sub-
ject of negotiation, Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB 1(3075; Professional 
Fire Fighters Association, Local 274, 10 PERB 1(3043. Accordingly, 
the entire demand must be deemed to be nonmandatory. 
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4. Article 7, Veteran's Benefits (Expired Agreement) 
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Veteran's Day off will be as provided in the applicable state 
statute (Public Officers Law). Any member of the unit who 
is a veteran and is required to work on, or any part of 
Memorial Day (last Monday in Ma}r) and/or Veteran's Day 
(fourth Monday in October) or are on vacation, or who are 
off duty due to a service-connected injury, shall be entitled 
to one additional day's pay or one compensatory day off. 
The City argues that this demand is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiation because the subject matter is covered by the Public 
Officers and General Construction Laws. We reject this argument. 
A demand relating to a subject which is treated by statute is nego-
tiable so long as the statute does not clearly preempt the entire 
subject matter and the demand does not diminish or merely restate 
the statutory benefits. Neither the statute nor the demand is of 
that nature here. The demand merely seeks additional compensation 
for work on particular holidays. Therefore, it is a mandatory sub' 
ject of negotiation. 
5. Article 8.1, Sick Leave (Proposed) 
This article establishes sick leave benefits for the members 
of the bargaining unit. Procedures implementing these bene-
fits will be covered in General Order No. 74.5, which is 
included in this contract as Appendix No. 2. Changes in 
this General Order will be made as follows: 
If and when either party to this agreement desires a change in 
these procedures during the term of the contract, he shall 
give at least thirty (30) calendar days notice, and upon ex-
piration of said thirty days, both parties shall state their 
respective demands in relation to this article. Good faith 
bargaining shall then commence, and should an impasse develop, 
the party who initiated such bargaining shall petition the 
Public Employment E.elations Board for arbitration of such 
dispute. 
This proposal does not deal with substantive sick leave bene-
fits. It concerns procedures for effectuating those benefits. The 
proposed procedures would incorporate by reference a general order. 
Examination of the order reveals that it contains some provisions 
that are not mandatory subjects of negotiation. These are, for 
exatirole, internal administrative procedures. The subject 
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demand-, therefore, is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
6. Article 8.3, Bills for Services (Proposed) 
Bills for professional service by private medical or surgi-
cal specialists rendered to members injured on duty or while 
on police department premises will be paid from City funds. 
The City's refusal to pay may be the subject of the grievance 
and arbitration provisions hereinafter set forth in this 
agreement. 
The City argues that this proposal is nonmandatory because 
the subject matter is covered by the General Municipal Law and 
also because statutory rights cannot be made subject to contrac-
tual arbitration. The statute does not preempt the subject matter 
and the demand does not diminish or merely restate the statutory 
benefits; accordingly, we reject the first argument. The second 
argument is also rejected. We are aware of no public policy pro-
hibiting the enforcement of contractual benefits through arbitra-
tion merely because such benefits may to some extent also be pro-
vided by statute. Accordingly^, we hold the demand to be mandatory 
7. Article 8.7, Untitled (Proposed) 
A member of the Department shall not be obligated to remain 
at home while on sick leave, nor shall the Department 
restrict his movements whatsoever. Any rule, regulation 
or policy to the contrary is hereby declared void. 
Although the subject of sick leave is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation, a demand that the employer relinquish to unit 
employees alone all control over abuses in the taking of sick 
leave is not. It is comparable to the demand held to be non-
mandatory in Onondaga Community College, 11 PERB <j[3045, that an 
employer relinquish all administrative control over the establish-
ment of employee workload. These are management rights which are 
not mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
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8. Article 10.1, Furloughs (Proposed) 
This article establishes vacation benefits for the members 
of the bargaining unit. Procedures implementing these 
benefits will be covered in General Order 74-6, which is 
included in this contract as Appendix Number 3. Changes 
in this General Order will be made as follows: 
If and when either party to this agreement desires a change 
in these procedures during the term of this contract, he 
shall give thirty (30) days notice of such desire to nego-
tiate. Upon expiration of such thirty days, both parties 
shall submit their demands and good faith bargaining shall 
commence. Should an impasse develop, the party initiating 
negotiations shall petition the Public Employment Relations 
Board for arbitration of such disputes. 
Like Article 8, which deals with the administrative imple-
mentation of sick leave benefits, this proposal incorporates by 
reference a general order which, upon examination, reveals that 
it contains some nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, such as 
coverage of non-unit employees. It is, therefore, not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
9. Article 20.2, Departmental Proceedings (Expired Agreement) 
(A) Members of the Police Bargaining Unit who are subject 
:..to investigation, by ±he.Internal "Affairs Section of 
••'..:..-the Police Department shall be informed of the nature 
of the investigation prior to questioning. 
(B) Subsequent to the filing of a complaint alleging a 
violation of departmental rules and regulations or 
general orders, and prior to the filing of Departmental 
charges, the member against whom the allegation was made 
shall be advised of the name of the complainant and 
the nature of the complaint, and shall be afforded the 
opportunity to be heard. The member may have counsel 
of his own choosing, which may include a representative 
of the Club. 
(C) When a complaint is sustained against a Unit member, a 
copy of such complaint shall be presented to him. 
Each of the three demands that constitute proposed Article 
20.2 is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. They each deal 
with disciplinary procedures for employees who are covered by 
§75 of the Civil Service Law. As we stated in Police Association 
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of New Rochelle, Inc., 10 PERB i[3042, and City of Auburn, 10 PERB 
1(3045, Civil Service Law §76.4 prohibits the negotiation of disci-
2 
plinary procedures for such employees. Moreover, the first two 
demands are not manidat.o.f.y;: 'subjects' of negotiation because they 
would prevent the City from making what is normally internal 
preliminary inquiry into the conduct of a unit employee by com-
pelling the City to advise the unit employee of the nature of the 
investigation and of the fact that a complaint had been made 
against him. This would tend to discourage the filing of justi-
fiable complaints and otherwise frustrate investigations that are 
normally an essential aspect of government managerial prerogative 
which overrides the duty to negotiate. 
10. Article 20.3, Untitled (Proposed) 
No employee shall be interrogated by the Pvochester Police 
Department unless he is first advised: 
(1) that he has the right to receive copies of all 
statements taken from witnesses in the investigation 
free of charge, and shall have a reasonable opportunity 
to review such statements prior to interrogation. 
(2) that the Department will not seek to impose disci-
pline upon him on the basis of any other evidence .than 
that which has been set forth in the notice of proposed 
discipline, and 
(3) that he has the right to a Club representative and/ 
or an attorney present during his interrogation, and 
(4) that he has a right to a copy of any statement he 
shall make, free of charge, and 
(5) that he has a right to be represented by a Club 
Representative and/or attorney at each step of the 
disciplinary procedure, and 
2 Our decision in City of Auburn is on appeal to the Court of 
Appeals. 
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(6) that he need not agree to be interrogated prior to a 
notice of proposed discipline being served upon him, and 
(7) that in all disciplinary proceedings, he is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proof 
is upon the Department, and 
(8) that he shall suffer no reprisals,: directly or indi-
rectly, for exercising his rights under this Article. 
These rights shall apply in all cases, whether the Department 
seeks to interrogate the employee or not. 
The first sentence of the demand would make it applicable to 
any type of investigation, including criminal. It is, for that 
reason alone, not a mandatory subject of negotiation, Troy 
Uniformed Firefighters Assn., 10 PERB T3015; FBA of Hempstead, 
11 PERB T3072. 
11. Article 20.7, Untitled (Proposed) 
An employee, in attending his disciplinary procedures, shall 
receive overtime compensation should these be scheduled at 
a time other than during his regular tour of duty. 
While the City views this demand as one to negotiate disci-
plinary proceedings, including proceedings preliminary thereto, 
we view it as a demand to negotiate for special monetary compensa-
tion.. It is, therefore, a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
12. Article 20.8, Untitled (Proposed) 
An employee shall be informed of the name(s) and rank(s) 
of all investigating officers upon his request. 
We read this demand as applicable to employees under investi-^  
gation. The demand is not mandatorily negotiable, as it does not 
exclude criminal investigations. Even if it did, we do not see 
how it would relate to a term or condition of a unit employee's 
employment. 
13. Article 21.2(C), Members' Rights (Expired Agreement) 
During interviews involving criminal allegations against a 
member, the following procedures are hereby established: 
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(C) The member shall not be subject to any offensive language. 
nor shall he be threatened with transfer, dismissal or any-
other disciplinary punishment. No promise of reward shall be 
made as an inducement to answering questions. Nothing herein 
contained is to be construed as to prohibit the Department 
from instructing the member that his or her failure to answer 
questions can become the subject of disciplinary action re-
sulting in disciplinary punishment. 
This demand relates to criminal investigations and, therefore, 
is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
14. Article 24.6, Filling of Vacancies (Expired Agreement) 
The City agrees to fill all Civil Service promotional vacancies 
within the Police Department within thirty (30) days from 
appropriate Civil Service lists when available. The City will 
forward to the Club a list of Civil Service vacancies within 
fifteen (15) days of their occurrence. This notice will 
clearly state the date that the vacancy occurred. 
The filling of vacancies is not a mandatory subject of nego-
tiation. (See Item 3) 
15. Article 31.4, Rules, Regulations and General Orders (Proposed) 
All rules, regulations and- general orders of the Rochester 
Police Department shall be the subject of bargaining between 
the parties. The rules, regulations and general orders in 
effect presently (April 26, 1978) shall expire on June 30, 1978 
by agreement of the parties. The City shall not impose new 
rules, regulations or general orders unless the Club agrees, 
and should an impasse develop,, the parties shall petition for 
arbitration of this interest dispute. 
Because this demand is not limited to those rules, regula-
tions and general orders fixing terms and conditions of emplojnnent 
it is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. However, even if 
limited to those areas, by providing for their expiration on a 
given date, the demand would terminate the status quo as it existed 
during the effective period of the rule and would appear to leave 
the City in a vacuum without any applicable procedures for the 
operation of its Police Department during the hiatus between pro-
cedures. It would, therefore, plainly not be negotiable even if 
limited to terms and conditions of employment. 
UiJL,' 
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16. Article 31.8, Change in General Orders (Proposed) 
The City agrees that once agreement is reached on General 
Orders, no new orders or changes may be implemented without 
negotiating with the Club. The provisions of Article 31, 
Section 4, shall apply thereto. 
We cannot find this to be a mandatory subject of negotiation 
because, among other reasons, it is not limited to general orders 
establishing terms and conditions of employment. 
17. Article 31.9, Off-Duty Police Action (Proposed) 
Police action taken by a member of the Department while off 
duty, shall entitle said member to all the applicable rights 
and benefits of this contract and of Section 207-c and 
section 30-j of the General Municipal Law to the same extent 
as if such action had been taken by said member while on 
duty. Any dispute arising under this section of the contract 
shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure. 
There shall be no provisos to this provision. 
This proposal, among other things, is not limited to police 
• . 3 
action taken within the geographic jurisdiction of the City and 
it would include police action taken within the scope of other 
4 
employment. It encompasses matters beyond the employment rela-
tionship between the parties governing the unit in question. 
Therefore, it is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
18. Article 31.10, Protection of Police Officers (Proposed) 
If an officer is named as a defendant in a civil action, or 
is charged or indicted in a criminal proceeding, as a result 
of activities pursued by the officer in the discharge of his 
duties, whether on or off duty, the City shall pay all legal 
fees and court costs incurred by the officer in his defense 
of said actions and proceedings, immediately upon receipt of 
the officer's demand. Any disputes arising under this section 
shall be submitted to the grievance and arbitration procedure 
of this contract. 
3_ Subdivision (c) of the corresponding section of the prior agree-
ment enables the Chief of Police to impose such a limitation. 
4 Subdivision (a) of the corresponding section of the. expired 
agreement excludes such action. 
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The City contends that this demand is not negotiable because 
the subject matter is covered by General Municipal Law §50-j and 
the underlying rights, being statutory, cannot be made subject to 
arbitration. For reasons already set forth herein (Demand No. 6, 
supra), both contentions are rejected. The demand is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
19. Unnumbered Article (Proposed) 
(a) An employee, with one (1) year or more of service shall 
be granted maternity leave of eighteen (18) months duration 
from the date of pregnancy but no longer than nine (9) 
months after the birth of the child and shall be returned to 
duty without loss of senior it}?- and longevity provided she 
notified the Department after six (6) months of leave that 
she intends to return. Longevity and seniority, however, 
shall not accrue during such leave. The police surgeon, after 
consultation with the employee's physician, shall determine 
when the employee no longer is able to properly perform her 
duties. The employee, at her sole discretion, may use sick 
leave, vacation, personal days, or compensatory time before 
being taken off the payroll. Such time shall be part of the 
eighteen (18) months. Upon return from such maternity leave, 
the employee shall be returned to service in the same rank. 
This proposal would treat pregnancy and childbirth dif-
ferently from other disabilities for purposes of leave. In Union 
Free School District No. 6 v. Human Plights Appeals Board, 35 NY2d 
371 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that a collectively nego-
tiated personnel policy which would "single out childbirth among 
other physical conditions for special treatment in fixing terms 
of compensation and of return to employment thereafter" violated 
the Human Rights Law. This proposal is, therefore, not a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the above conclusions of law, 
WE ORDER, 
1. The City of Rochester to negotiate in good faith 
with the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc., with 
respect to those demands which we have determined to 
be mandatory subjects of negotiation; and 
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DATED: 
2. We dismiss the charge with respect to those 
demands we have determined not to be mandatory subject; 
of negotiation. 
New York, New York 
January 25, 1979 
^//we^/ 4^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/C3^ex^-<a-^ 
I d a K l a u s , Member 
David C. Randies*", Mem' 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the 
COUNTY 
LOCAL 
UNION, 
Matter of 
OF ALBANY, 
-and-
200, GENERAL SERVICE 
SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Employer, : 
.EMPLOYEES' : 
Petitioner. : 
#21-1/24/79 
Case Nos. C-1704 & C-1713 
AMENDMENT OF CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
The certification in the above-entitled matter (11 PERB 1(3070.1, 
September 14, 1978) is amended to include in the negotiating unit: 
Dietary Service and Food Service. 
DATED: New York, New York 
January 24, 1979 
Wa**~e^ P. /{^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YOP" 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATI .S.BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEBUTUCK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
-and- Employer, 
WEBUTUCK CENTRAL EDUCATORS ORGANIZATION, 
NYEA/NEA, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
•WEBUTUCK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO,• 
Intervenor. 
#2J-l/24/79 
Case No. C-1771 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been .conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that .a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
the Webutuck Teachers Association, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above'named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by-
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the- purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances.' 
Unit: Included: Classroom teachers, special teachers (art, music,: 
language, physical education), remedial teachers,; 
librarian, school nurse teachers, speech hearing ; 
therapists. 
Excluded: All others. 
. Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with 
the Webutuck Teachers Association, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall, 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 24th day of January , 1979 
New York, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Kla/us, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YOB' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATI, .S . BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
-and-
Emplo'yer, 
LOCAL UNION 8 91, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF 
OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
ASSOCIATION OF DISTRICT AND BOROUGH 
SUPERVISORS. OF SCHOOL CUSTODIANS AND 
CUSTODIAN ENGINEERS,. 
#2K-l/24/79 
C a s e No. C-1764 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that .a 
negotiating representative has been selected, , 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, . 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local Union 891, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and.described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. . • • 
Unit: Included: District and borough supervisors .of school, 
custodians and custodian-engineers. 
Excluded: ' All other employees. 
!; ..Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public || employer shall negotiate collectively with Local.Union 891," 
jj International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO :' 
!• ' • . . ' ' 
; and enter into a written agreement with such employee- organization 
'. with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
j: negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
:| determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
: Signed on the 24th day of January , 19 79 
: New York, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
PER3 58.3 
/f%<*<^~ 
M £Z 
David C. R a n d i e s , Meiiiiier 
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STATE OF NEW YOB" 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATI . .S.BOARD 
# 2 L - l / 2 4 / 7 9 
Case No. C-1692 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF TONAWANDA, 
Employer, 
-and-
TOWN OF TONAWANDA HOURLY EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner.,-
-and-
AFSCME, LOCAL 2629, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that .a • 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by- the 
Public Employees' .Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Tonawanda- Hourly 
Employees Association 
has been designated -and selected by a majority of the employees 
"of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time, hourly paid personnel regularly 
employed in the various departments of the Town. 
Excluded: Seasonal, part-time and temporary employees. 
!; .'Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
j- employer shall negotiate collectively with the Town of. Tonawanda 
j! Hourly Employees Association \ 
! ' . • ' • • '; 
'-. and enter into a written agreement'with such employee organization 
'. with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
;j negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
.1 determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
:
 Signed on the 24th day of January, 1979 
;
 New York, New York 
up/^ //IZ, ± 
Harold R. Newman-, Chairman 
A, /^ 4w^  
Ida Klaus, Member 
i(JU<±x>«JL 
D a v i d C . R a n d i e s , Member embi 
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PEUQ 5 0 . 3 : 
STATE OF NEW YOP" 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATI_ .S.BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA,' 
Petitioner. 
#2M-l/24/79 
Case No. C-1652 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the ! 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
;'. ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act andy the ' 
j Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a ] 
; negotiating representative has been selected, . j 
; Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the ] 
• Public Employees' Fair Employment.-Act, . ' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communications Workers \ 
of America, AFL-CIO I 
j 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees \ 
. of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by I 
• the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-. 
;
 ment' of grievances. . '.. . i 
j Unit: Included: Administrative Assistant, Administrative Assis-
I tant' (IBM Equipment), Administrative Assistant ! 
; (Secretarial), Administrative Associate, Person- : 
j „ • • . nel Assistant, Personnel Associate, Senior. .! 
j Administrative Assistant, District Business | 
j " Officer, Personnel Aide (CETA), Clerk Grade 5 | (serving in a position equated to any of the 
! ;> foregoing titles), and District Manager of | Administration and Business Affairs. 
;! . Excluded: All other employees. I 
;j . ; 
• .Further, IT.IS ORDERED that the above named public 
,| employer shall negotiate collectively with the Communications. 
j Workers of America, AFL-CIO ! 
' and enter into a written agreement, with such employee organization 
. with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
I negotiate collectively- with such employee organization in the 
\ determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 24th day of 
New York, New York 
January , 19 79 
arold R. Newman, Chai H r  
-^iA^—ptC/i y^/ 
£L*. JH&.. 
PEP.B 5 3 . 3 
wJ<£f^?jJL 
David C. R a n d i e s , Memfefer 
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